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Theology (s. T. D.)from the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in
1985. magna cum laude.

In a recent book, When Did I Begin? Contraception of the Human
Individual in History. Philosophy and Science (Cambridge University
Press, 1988), Norman Ford argues that an individual human person does
not begin at fertilization but some fourteen days later with the appearance
of the primitive streak. He attempts to relate philosophical concepts such as
"ontological individual" and "personal identity" to recent embryological
evidence. In "A Critical Note" Nicholas Tonti-Filippini responds, arguing
that a new human person begins at fertilization . He makes a number of
valid points comparing monozygotic twinning to various forms of asexual
reproduction including cloning. He argues that Ford demands "more of the
early embryo than he would of an adult human individual.") In a
subsequent article Ford replies, saying that Tonti-Filippini shows no signs
of "having grasped the thrust of the central line of my reasoning and he fails
to mention some of my crucial arguments."2 In this article I wish to respond
to some of these other "crucial arguments."
In his book Ford develops his thesis quite extensively. While I think his
work deserves careful consideration, I think he has misinterpreted some of
the biological data, especially concerning monozygotic twinning and
chimera formation . My own conclusion is that a new human person does
indeed begin with the proper completion of human fertilization. This
ontological question is very relevant to certain ethical issues such as nontherapeutic research on and / or the destruction of early human embryos.
Before offering some criticisms of a number of Ford's arguments and
explaining my own position, I would like to note that we have more in
common than what separates us. Of particular significance, Ford's book
offers some good and clear arguments refuting some other common views
that a human person only begins to exist later than it does in his view, such
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as at birth or viability or when the human organism has the developed
structures and immediate capacity to exercise rational thought. Here, Ford
employs well such concepts as ontological individual and active
potentiality. He rightly sees that a personalist understanding of the human
individual needs to be complemented by a metaphysical understanding. He
sees the Aristotelian hylomorphic (matter-form) theory whereby the soul is
the form of the body as a satisfactory way of explaining the fundamental
psychosomatic and ontological unity of the human individual. I agree with
Ford when he says that
Once there is a biologically human organism that, without loss of ontological
identity, has the potential to develop all that is necessary for eventually exercising
typically human self-conscious rational acts , there is a true human individual [a
person in the traditional sense).3

The main focus of this article, however, will be to discuss certain points of
disagreement with Ford. My hope is that this will make a contribution to
our search for the truth in this area.
Some Points of Disagreement Regarding Monozygotic Twinning
Ford argues that at the first cell division, some hours after fertilization,
the zygote becomes "two independent cells, two living individuals" and that
at the second mitotic division there are "four distinct, contiguous,
genetically identical cells with the zona pellucida. "4 He says each of these
cells behaves as an individual. Each draws nutrients from its own cytoplasm
and the surrounding fluids to provide for its energy requirements. Each is
totipotent, that is, each has the capacity, given the right environment, to
generate the cell progeny required for the complete individual offspring.
Soon after this stage totipotency is restricted to groups of cells. Identical
(monozygotic) twinning in the human can occur naturally anytime from the
two-cell stage to the stage when the primitive streak forms about fourteen
days after fertilization . Intercellular communication and cell differentiation
begin to appear in the human from about the eight-cell stage onwards.
Concerning the morula stage, he says, "The flexibility of movement and
allocation of cells as distinct entities argues strongly against the morula
being a single human individual."5
I find Ford's interpretation of the biological data here to be faulty on a
number of grounds. The fact that cells may independently take in nutrients
from their surroundings and move does not necessarily mean that they are
distinct ontological individuals rather than parts of one ontological
individual- one person in this case. If this were true, cells that act in these
ways after the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak (e.g. the
migration of cells at various stages of organogenesis or even unattached
moving cells within body fluids such as the blood within the adult human
being) should not be regarded as parts of one individual person but as each
being distinct ontological individuals.6 Such a view would contradict
another conclusion of Ford with which I agree:
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Although all the cells in our bodies are genetically identical. each one is not a
distinct ontological individual. There is only one human individual .. . [that]
n:ally exists in the primary sense of actual existence. though there are many cells
which share in the existence of that single living human being. 7

Thc totipotentiality of cells or groups of cells does not mean that they can
1wt be parts of one ontological individual, one living organism or one
human being. Many mature plants have single somatic cells that are
totipotent. If separated from the plant and placed in appropriate cultures
they can each give rise to a whole new plant. 8 These totipotent cells were
certainly integral parts of the plant before being separated . In early human
embryos cells or certain groups of cells during the first cell-divisions will
lwt actualize their totipotentiality unless separated (cf. monozygotic twins,
triplets .. .) or unless the other totipotent cells or cell groups are destroyed.
Monozygotic twinning is a rare human phenomenon occurring at
remarkably constant rates of about 3.5 per 1000 maternities. The reported
monozygotic triplet rate is below 3 per 100,000 maternities. 9 In the usual
case. totipotent cells or groups of cells in the early human embryo will only
actualize a pluripotentiality or multi potentiality For instance, at the
two-and four-cell stages, although each of the cells is 'totipotent' in the
sense that each has the potential to give rise to a whole new human being,
each will usually only give rise to many parts of one human being. 10 As
long as totipotent cells or groups of cells remain together they constitute
integral parts of a whole. 11 They do not behave as independent entities
unless something causes them to separate. In the usual case they remain
together and they and their cell progeny act in interdependent and
complementary ways in precise harmony, each contributing many parts to
the mature organism or adult human being who results, provided
development proceeds normally.
Certain cells also have pluripotentiality (although in a more restricted
sense) at various stages of organogenesis later on in the developmental
process. Even in the adult human being "stem cells" in the bone marrow are
pluripotent. 12 These cells which actualize a pluripotentiality are certainly
parts of one ontolotical individual, living organism or human being.
Ford seems to assume that there must be some specification or
differentiation of parts, some commitment of cells or groups of cells in
certain directions, before an individual human being can exist. 13 Does this
not reflect a certain erroneous bias, that is, one in favor of specification or
"s pecialization"?
Consider a newborn infant before it has been exposed to anyone of the
many human languages. In an analogous sense the healthy infant at this
stage has certain "totipotentiality" or "pluripotentiality" with regard to
language. He or she could learn anyone of the many human languages as
his or her "mother tongue." When the infant becomes an adult that has
grown up with one language as his or her "mother tongue", he or she, in a
real sense, is irreversibly committed this . Although this adult could learn
other languages, no other language be his or her "mother tongue".
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One could also consider specialization in a career. A young person that has
not become highly specialized in one area is usually more versatile with
regard to career changes than an older person who has been committed to
one line of work and has been highly specialized for a long time. Concerning
commitment, one could consider too a person before and after entering an
indissoluble monogamous marriage (cf. the Catholic understanding of a
valid sacramental marriage) . Before entering such a marriage a person has a
certain "multipotentiality". One has the potential to become the spouse of
anyone of many people, to so commit oneself to anyone of a vast number
of other persons. Once one has validly entered such a marriage
(unconditionally committed oneself to only one definite person) one has
lost this multiple potentiality (at least until one's spouse dies).
It is a common phenomenon of human development (not only at the
biological level) that earlier stages have a wider potentiality than later
stages. In the cases of language, career and marriage, having a wider
potentiality or being less specialized or committed in one direciton or not
yet committed to one of many possible directions does not mean that one is
less of a person or not a person.
Concerning the human person's right to life, the Vatican's 1974
Declaration on Procured Abortion. n. 12, states that discrimination based
on the various stages of human life (or development) is no less inexcusable
than any other form of discrimination (e.g. racism, sexism). 14 It seems to me
that discrimination based on being less differentiated (i.e. re one's cells or
parts having totipotentiality or a greater pluripotentiality) or less
specialized (re language, career and so on) with respect to whether one is a
human person or not is incorrect. Being highly specialized (or committed to
a specific role) in a highly differentiated society can have a certain
functional value. Also being at a later stage of development and already
having cells or parts or dispositions that are highly differentiated or
specialized can enable one to perform certain functions that one could not
at an earlier stage of development, that is, before the potential to develop
these was actualized . These, however, do not affect one's status or dignity as
a human being and fundamental equality with other human beings.
Concerning Ford's noting that there is no intercellular communication
between the cells in the early or pre-embryo from the two-cell stage to the
eight-cell stage, one can note first of all that this is a relatively short time
(approximately fourteen to thirty hours IS). Secondly, there may be more
going on between the cells than we have so far detected or that our present
limited technology is capable of detecting. Scientists working in this area
acknowledge that there is much that we do not know. Certainly there is
much more going on than scientists have so far discovered or identified. 16
Reality is more complex and dynamic than our present state of
understanding. Thirdly, and perhaps most significant to the argument, at
certain later stages of development involving the genesis of distinct tissues in
the living organism (note these follow the stage of the appearance of the
primitive streak), some cells do not communicate with neighboring cells for
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a time. In fact, this seems necessary to the differentiation process. 17 These
cells within the "embryo proper" (after fourteen days) that do not
communicate with neighbouring cells for a time would be regarded not as
different ontological individuals but as parts of the same ontological
individual (human person), according to Ford's thesis. Cells from the
two-cell stage human embryo to the stage of the appearance ofthe primitive
streak should thus also be regarded as parts of one ontological human being
unless there is evidence that twinning has occurred. If there is evidence that
twinning has occurred, then the various cells should be regarded as parts of
two human persons respectively.
Ford argues that extra-embryonic tissues including the chorion and
placenta, even though their genetic constitution is identical to the fetus ,
should not be regarded as integral parts of the human individual or
embryo / fetus proper. He notes that respect and grief have traditionally
been shown for the stillborn fetus which is sometimes buried, but this is not
done for the placenta. IS In response to this view Tonti-Filippini says that
certain other parts of the human body such as deciduous teeth and hair are
discarded in the same way as the placenta. This does not mean that they
were never integral parts of the human being in question. 19
Ford, however, gives a number of arguments on this issue which TontiFilippini does not address. Ford considers the placenta to be an auxiliary
organ and notes that in the case of monozygotic twins one placenta may
serve the needs of two fetuses . Here he does not consider the placenta to be a
constituent part of either fetus. Elsewhere, however, he mentions that
conjoined twins can share certain tissues and organs, without relating it to
this issue. As long as the conjoined twins have distinct brains, he would
regard them as distinct ontological individuals (human persons).20
How should tissues and organs including "extraembryonic" ones as the
placenta 21 that are shared by monozygotic twins be considered? With
regard to conjoined twins, it seems to me that a part that one twin can
voluntarily control but not the other (e.g. movement of a certain limb) or
which is linked to its brain (e.g. which twin senses touch or pain in a certain
part, or which twin's brain is unambiguously involved in regulating a
certain organ) should unambiguously be considered a part of that twin.
Parts that are without nerves (e.g. the outer layer of skin, hair) should be
regarded as being parts of one or the other twin, since it makes sense to see
only one principle of unity or substantial form as unifying any given matter
at a given time. For the most part this may not be too difficult to discern due
to the location of the part or its connection or unity with clearly identifiable
parts of one of the twins (e .g. hair on its head or surface skin on its arm or
the part is receiving blood from the same blood vessels as other parts of the
twin). Concerning some parts, cells or tissues though, where exactly to draw
the line may not always be easy or possible for us (e.g. of skin or a blood
vessel that links the two).
I think one should consider "shared" parts of the placenta or chorion or
amnion, also in the case of non-conjoined monozygotic twins, in a similar
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way. A part clearly linked to one twin (e.g. by umbilical cord and blood
vessels) should be regarded as a part of that twin. Certain parts of the
placenta and so on, however, may be difficult or impossible for us to ascribe
definitely to one or the other twin. This does not mean that they are not in
reality a part of one or the other, anymore than other "shared" parts (tissues
or organs) of conjoined twins.
Concerning this issue it can also be noted that the delineation of "embryo
proper" and "extraembryonic" tissue is not as simple as Ford presents once
the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak has arrived. For example,
during the fourth week following fertilization, as the embryo folds, part of
the "extraembryonic" material (part of the yolk sack) is incorporated into
the embryo as the foregut and midgut. 22 In light of this and my conclusion
(one held by many scientists and medical personne(23) that the placenta and
so on are integral parts of the living system with the embryo / fetus and
should be regarded as parts of the human being in question, there is no
difficulty in seeing the human zygote and pre-embryo as an individual
human being (or two human beings if there is already evidence that
twinning has occurred). I agree with Ford that "A human individual could
not be present before it is actually formed ."24 He thinks that this could not
be the case if it has not yet been determined which cells' progeny will give
rise to the embryo and fetus proper and which cells' progeny will give rise to
extraembryonic tissues. Even if this is so, if the "extraembryonic" tissues
(placenta... ) are parts of the human being in question, then the zygote
should be regarded as a human being and its cell progeny, whether they give
rise to the embryo and fetus proper or to "extraembryonic" tissues, should
be regarded as parts of a human being.
Some Points of Disagreement Regarding Chimera Formation

Ford speaks of experiments with mice and how
... single cells taken from three separate early mouse embryos can be aggregated to
form a single viable chimeric mouse with characteristics of all three parent
embryos ... the resultant chimeric mouse certainly did not begin at the zygote
stage. This suggests that in the normal situation, genetically similar cell progeny
[spelling corrected] of a zygote subsequently form the definitive individual body,
be it that of a mouse or a human individual.2 5

It seems to me that, in some ways, grafting (and even organ
transplantation) is similar to chimera formation. Perhaps chimera
formation can be seen as a very early form of grafting. In neither chimera
formation nor in grafting (nor in organ transplantation) does the
transplanted cell (or cells) and its progeny or the transplanted tissue, organ
or grafted part lose its genetic inheritance. There is no mixing of the genes.
Certain parts of a chimeric mouse (or even a chimeric sheep-goat
combination, etc.) carry the genes from one set of parents, other parts carry
the genes from another set of parents and so on. 26 In a graft, the grafted part
and any parts that develop from it carry the genes of the organism from
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which it was derived. For example, a fruit producing branch from a cherry
tree grafted to an apple tree will produce cherries and not apples.
Transplanted tissue or an organ from one person to another, or even from
one species to another, still carries the genes and tissues markers of the
donor. This is why the recipient's body will usually reject the donated organ
unless mechanisms of rejection are suppressed (e.g. by certain drugs) even
though the transplanted tissue has become a part of the recipient as an
ontological individual.
I think it is proper to see the embryo, the cherry tree and the donor as
each being ontological individuals before a certain part ofthem is removed
or disassembled and grafted, transplanted or assembled to another
ontological individual or part of another ontological individual. The viable
chimera (also at the early embryo stage), tree with a grafted part, person
with a transplanted organ, should also be seen as ontological individuals. In
the usual case of grafting and organ transplantation one can see a continuity
of the recipient as an ontological individual before and after the graft or
transplant. This may not always be the case though. For example, in the
case of a "head transplant" (e.g. the brain of the "recipient" is totally dead
and the body of the "donor" can no longer support his or her brain), does
the "donor" or the "recipient" continue as an ontological individual? It
seems to me that the "donor" would here. Perhaps, in this case, it would be
better to call this a "body transplant" and say that the identity of the
"recipient", as in other transplants, continues. 27
Or consider the partial replacement (transplant or graft) of brain tissue
(or precursor cells that later produce brain tissue) from one fetus or embryo
proper to another. 28 If the brain of the recipient as an adult contains some
parts that carry the genes of one and other parts that carry the genes of the
other, which ontological individual has continued? If we are unable to know
with certainty this does not necessarily mean that one of the ontological
individuals did not continue. Another possibility is that the identities of
both original fetuses / embryos were destroyed and a new individual began
to exist at the time of the transplant. I n any case, according to Ford's view,
the living fetus or embryo proper, whether a subsequent donor or recipient,
would already be an ontological individual.
It seems to me that in the case of the chimeric mouse, if as an adult all of
its brain carried genes derived from one of the early embryos, then that
ontological individual could be seen as continuing. If, however, the adult's
brain contained parts which carried genes from more than one early
embryo, then it may be difficult or impossible for us to know which
ontological individual continued and which did not. Our not being able to
tell would not necessarily mean that one of the ontological individuals did
not continue, anymore than in the case described above involving the
partial replacement of brain tissue in the fetus or embryo proper. Another
possibility is that the identity of the original embryos (each an ontological
individual before being disassembled) was destroyed and the chimera is a
newly created ontological individuaJ.29 The identity ofthe disassembled
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living cells before reassembly, it seems to me, might be comparable to the
identity of a living organ after it has been removed from the donor but
before it has been transplanted into the recipienpo
Some Disagreement Related to "Identifiable Body Plan"
Ford notes that at the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak we
can distinguish the back from the front (cf. its dorsal and ventral surfaces),
the top from the bottom (cf. its cranial and caudal ends) , the right from the
left sides of the body (it now has clearly identifiable bilateral symmetry). He
seems to assume that we must be able to do this before we have a human
body, a distinct on-going ontological individual human being. 3l
Concerning this it should be noted that one can tell the front from the back
before this stage, with the formation of the inner cell mass and the
embryonic disc. Also with the formation of the prochordal plate (evident
slightly before the primitive streak), from which the mouth develops, one
can discern the top / bottom and left / right of this young human being. If
identical twins only form at the stage of the appearance of the primitive
streak (this is very rare), that is, two primitive streaks appear and the
embryonic disk divides (not completely in the case of conjoined twins), the
prochordal plate will still be at the top side (cranial end) of both twins and
the primitive streaks will be at the bottom side (caudal end).32 In such a very
rare case there may be some mistake on our part (due to our limited
technology) with respect to identifying left and right sides before the
appearance of the primitive streaks.
In any case, if we are unable to identify intrinsic top from bottom, front
from back, right from left of something, or even if they do not exist, this
does not mean that this entity is not an ontological individual. Can one
identify intrinsic top from bottom and so on in a spherical or cube-shaped
body? In such bodies it is no doubt more accurate to say that intrinsic top
and bototm and so on do not exist. This does not preclude a spherical body
and a cube-shaped body from being ontological individuals; indeed they
are. Ifwe are unable to tell top from bottom and so on, or even if they do not
yet exist, in the early embryo which is roughly spherical in shape from the
zygote to the morula stage, this does not preclude these from being various
stages in the development of a human being.
Also, at the stages of the appearance of the inner cell mass, the embryonic
disk, the prochordal plate and the primitive streak, why do these develop in
particular locations (sides) rather than others? It is not necessary to
postulate some kind of polarity in the early embryo, before the stage of the
appearance of the primitive streak, to account for what happens? Nothing
happens without a cause. Some scientists conclude that the early embryo
has polarity before the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak. 33
The Early Human Embryo is Usually Just One Living Organism
A notable philosophical treatment of the issue "When did I begin?" or the
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status of the zygote / em bryo / fetus is by J oht1 Gallagher. I t1 it1terpreting the
biological data he makes use of the prit1ciple of economy or panimot1y.
According to this principle
... one should not posit the existence of some further reality to explain
phenomena when the phenomena can be explained just as well by the realities one
already knows to exist. To posit the existence of this further reality which is not
demanded by the phenomena is to go beyond the available evidence, to be fanciful
rather than realistic. 34

Beginning with our common experience of persons, Gallagher identifies the
human person in this workd with a particular living organism of a certain
kind . Thus a new human person began to exist when this living organism
(an ontological individual in Ford's sense 35) began to exist. Gallagher
carefully examines a number of hypotheses (with references to various
authors who hold these) that a human person begins to exist at some point
later than fertilization. He concludes: " ... there is no real evidence of a new
human person beginning to exist at any of these points . ... We conclude
therefore, that the more economical explanation should be held - namely,
that the embryo is a human person from the time of fertilization.'36
Since the seventh hypothesis which Gallagher discusses is quite similar to
Ford's thesis, we will consider it here briefly. Under this hypothesis
Gallagher discusses both monozygotic twinning and chimera formation . Of
note in his treatment, Gallagher considers whether the early embryo might
constitute a colony, a collection of one-celled organisms that act together
but do not constitute one multicellular organism. Although the early stage
embryo has one quality in common with colonies, "cells can break away
from the main body, and develop into a structure similar to the main body"
(cf. monozygotic twinning), Gallagher concludes that the early embryo is
not a colony but one organism because
In one crucial way the early stage embryo is quite different from a colony and
~uch more like an organism. The cells of the embryo work together in the very
precise and complex way necessary for the embryo to develop into the fully formed
baby, who is certainly one organism. The cells of a colony do not work in this way.
The embryo thus exhibits much more unity than does the colonyY

Let us now compare Gallagher's and Ford's views more closely.
According to Ford the human zygote is one ontological individual (one
organism). He, however, sees the two-cell stage early embryo as two
ontological individuals (two organisms). From this stage until the latest
stage when monozygotic twinning can occur (when the primitive streak or
streaks appear about fourteen days after fertilization) , he argues,
.. . we do not have a living individual human body, but a mass of pre-programmed
loosely organized developing cells and heterogeneous tissues until their 'clock'
mechanisms become synchronized and triggered to harmoniously organize,
differentiate and grow as heterogeneous parts of a single who le human organism. 38

Is the early human embryo or pre-embryo only one multicellular
organism (two in the rare case of monozygotic twinning ... ) or a mass of
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loosely organized unicellular organisms (a colony in the biological sense)? It
seems to me helpful to consider how biologists, who study the vast diversity
of living things, define an organism. Eugene 1. Fenster and Ulf Sorhannus
say, "The organism is a whole; it functions as an integrated unit."39 William
H. Telfer and Donald Kennedy say, " . . . a multicellular organism, rather
than being a haphazard structure, is formed with precision." Its rigidly
limited genetic endowment "leads it to develop to a predetermined shape
and size, and any significant deviation from that form is generally
disastrous to the biological success of the individual .. . ."40 Between onecelled organisms and multicellular organisms William T. Keeton says there
exist a diversity of colonies with increasing coordination of activity and
interdependence among cells. At the latter end of this spectrum he considers
it "largely an arbitrary decision whether one calls Volvox colonial or
multicellular. "41
It does not seem to me at all arbitrary, though, to consider the early
human embryo or pre-embryo as one organism (two in the rare case of
monozygotic twinning ... ) rather than a colony. In line with the above
definitions of an organism, the normal early human embryo's cells
constitute a whole, because they function as an integrated unit. Even
'totipotent' cells or groups of cells function as parts of a whole unless
something causes them to separate (cf. the discussion above under
monozygotic twinning). In rare cases when monozygotic twinning occurs,
whether separation of 'totipotent' cells or groups of cells occurs at an early
cleavage stage or of the inner cell mass or the embryonic disk, the cells
simply begin functioning as respective parts of two wholes.
The early human embryo or pre-embryo does not develop haphazardly.
Unless some anomaly occurs, it "is formed with precision". We can say this
even though there is much about its growth and differentiation that we do
not understand. Contemporary works on human embryology all outline
the same stages of normal development (zygote, early cleavage stages,
morula, blastocyst, development of the inner cell mass, embryonic disk and
so on). These events occur at regular predictable times.42 In normal
development differentiation and restriction of the potency of cells occurs at
appropriate stages and times. If, for example, the restriction of the
potentiality of cells or groups of cells (also during early cleavage stages)
occurred too early this could be detrimental to normal development. As an
organism, the early embryo develops first what it needs to develop first and
so on. For example, part of the blastocyst, the mural trophoblast, which
appears to be essential for implantation to occur, already "is apparently in
its terminal stages of differentiation" .43 Movement of cells within the early
embryo follows a prescribed pattern (contrast cancer cells). To enable this
tight junction, desmosomes and so on not only form at appropriate times
and places, but also are disrupted and reform at appropriate times and
places during early human development. 44
In light of the above, it seems to me clear that Gallagher'S view that from
the time of fertilization the early human embryo is one living organism, a
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human person, is more reasonable than Ford's. If and when monozygotic
twinning occurs, then from that point on we simply have two living
organisms, two persons. Ford's postulating that between the zygote stage
and the stage of the appearance of the primitive streak(s) there is a loosely
organized mass of cells (a colony in the biological sense) is unnecessary to
explain the biological phenomena. It is an uneconomical explanation. His
saying that the 'clock' mechanisms of these cells only " become synchronized
and triggered to harmoniously organize, differentiate and grow as
heterogeneous parts of a single whole human organism"45 at the stage of the
appearance of the primitive streak is contrary to the evidence. It implies that
the organization, differentiation and so on of these cells prior to this stage
are not synchronized and harmonious. This is not true. Concerning the
two-cell stage of the early human embryo, Ford's saying that "Two
contiguous identical cells do not constitute one living individual"46 is also
mistaken. First, since one of these cells divides before the other, these cells
are not completely identical even ifthey are both 'totipotent'.47 Second, this
statement implies that one ontological individual cannot have similar parts.
He himself, however, speaks of a new piece of glass as being one ontological
individua1. 48 Does not a new piece of glass have many parts that are quite
similar except for their respective positions? Even in a living adult human
person, who is clearly one ontological individual or organism, many bodily
parts are quite similar to other parts.
In light of the above, we can, therefore, conclude that the early human
embryo is usually just one living organism. In the rare case when
monozygotic twinning occurs we simply have two living organisms.
The Status of the Human Zygote/Early Embryo
The Vatican's 1974 Declaration on Procured Abortion states, "From the
time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the
father nor of the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his
[her] own growth.(12)49 This Declaration, however, deliberately leaves
untouched the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused
(see its note 19). The Vatican's Instruction on Respectfor Human Life in its
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation also does not answer this
question. Nevertheless, it teaches that
... the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to
say from the moment the zygote has formed , demands the unconditional respect
that is morally due to the human being in his [her] bodily and spiritual totality. The
human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of
conception; and therefore from that same moment his [her] rights as a person must
be recognized , among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every
innocent human being to life. (1.1)'0

When does God infuse the spiritual soul? My opinion is that this
normally happens when there is adequate mixing of the materials (including
the haploid chromosome sets) of the human sperm and ovum, at syngamy,
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when the process offertilization has been properly completed.51 This is the
time when the sperm and ovum become a zygote. A new living organism has
been formed. This new organism with a new "program" now has a new
principle of unity (form) which organizes its (his or her) development for the
rest of its life. It now has the active potentiality to develop towards the
mature or adult form of human life, even though favorable environmental
conditions are necessary for this potentiality to be actualized. When the
sperm first enters the ovum, much of its contents including its nuclear
contents have not yet mixed with those of the ovum. At this point I would
regard it as one ontological individual within another (a part from the
father within a part from the mother) . From this stage to the completion of
fertilization, the two are in the process of becoming one.
This time for the infusion of the soul seems to me to be consistent with
both the biblical view of the unity of the human person, who is identified
with both one's soul and body or flesh,52 and the Aristotelian / Thomistic
philosophical view of the unity of matter and form, body and soul. 53 It
seems logical to hold that once the two have become one flesh, a new living
organism has begun to exist with a new form or principle which gives it
unity and teleology and which organizes its growth and development for the
rest of its life. We now have a new human person in our midst, with both
body and soul.
Concerning monozygotic twinning, at whatever stage this happens
(between the two-cell stage and the stage of the appearance of the primitive
streak about fourteen days after fertilization), it seems to me that another
new human person, with a new human soul, would begin to exist whenever
a new organized whole emerges that already has the form and teleology to
develop towards another mature adult human being and has in fact begun
to do SO.54 In reality this may happen a short time before we are capable of
detecting with our present instruments of technology. This may occur, at
least sometimes, before complete visible separation of the matter takes
place (cf. the case of conjoined twins whose bodies are not completely
separated physically but who are nevertheless two distinct persons}.55 My
conclusion is that we ought to regard the one-celled zygote as one human
person and respect him or her as such. If it later becomes evident that there
is now in fact another organized whole in existence developing towards
another adult human being (this would also be true of a cloned human
being), then we ought to regard this as another human person and respect
him or her as such.
In closing, since a good part of this article has focused on criticizing some
of Ford's arguments, I would like to note some ofthe merits of his book. It
presents a number of various views on the topic clearly and accurately. The
book's many notes refer to much of the relevant literature in this field
-biological, philosophical (also some re the Bible and Church teaching)
and government reports. The book, as noted above (third paragraph), also
includes some good and clear arguments refuting some other views that a
human person only begins to exist later than it does in his view (some
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fourteen days after fertilization) such as at birth or viability or when the
human organism has the developed structures and immediate capacity to
exercise rational thought. It is worthwhile noting here, too, that Norman
Ford, in spite of his personal opinion in this area, explicitly expresses his
agreement with the Catholic Church's teaching expressed in Humanae
Vitae and Donum Vitae. 56 He is to be commended for explicitly affirming
that "the Creator's plan for the responsible transmission of human life as the
fruit of an act of conjugal love should not be intentionally frustrated", and
from a moral point of view, given the present state of the discussion, "the
benefit of any reasonable doubt about the personal status of the early
human embryo must be resolved by treating the human embryo as a person
from conception."57 On these points we are in agreement. With respect to
the ontological question discussed here though, my conclusion, as
explained above, differs from Ford's. I think that it is reasonable to hold
that a new human person begins with the proper completion of human
fertilization.
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